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L
Respondents' brief says:

(P. 41-42):

uHow could the granting of the last
amended cross-complaint of appellant in c;a.ny
way affect the plaintiffs in this present action
who seek to quiet title herein? ---None of
the pla:-ntlffs herein (insofar as this action
affects the property involved in this appeal)
were parties to the original action.
had passed from J" Parry Bowen.

The res
To set

aside the former decree as to him would
not affect the subject matter of the former
act~O!L

Such a procedure would be a nullity,

of no effect, and merely incidental to the
present actlon without affecting the res at
alL

Neither would such action affect the

present owners of the res, as they are not
parbes to the original action and cannot be
made such by cross-complaint filed herein."
To say that the res had passed from
J" Parry Bowen to the other plaintiffs and
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2o
cross defendants by virtue of his default
judg~ent,

and in the same breath to say that

to set 1t aside would be of no consequence
is, it seems to us, an incongruous position
for respondents to take here in view of the
record they made below with respect to
that judgmento
It is true that respondents claimed
that the former judgment was not void on
its face, but they also claimed that it is in
all respects a valid judgment, with respect
to J Parry Bowen as well as to the other
o

respondents
plaint~s

a

They deny the cross =com-

allegations of fraud in its procure-

ment, admit that they claim ownership interests under and by virtue of it, introduced
it in evidence and asked the Court. to grant

them a summary judgment on the strength
of it and to hold it res adjudicata as to J-.
Parry Bowen as well as to the other plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tiff 5 and eros s ~defendants which the Court
dido
Respondents Keith J

o

Bowen, J. A.

Cheney, Guy T. Woodworth, Morley Dea;n,
Irene M" Dean and Ph11lips Petroleum Company

d~d

not attempt to disassociate them=

selves from J. Parry Bowen in connection
with the question bf extrinsic fraud in the
procurement of that judgment. They do not
plead that they are uinnocent purchasers
for

value'~

and rely on the contention that

the judgment is valid on it's face and that
they were not aware of and were not put

up~=

on inquiry as to fraud in connection with it's
procuremenL On the contrary, they were
and are one with J o Parry Bowen in seeking to have that judgment held uvalid in
all respects

g"

and as res adjudicata as to J.

Parry Bowen as well as themselves against
any attack on the ground of fraud however
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made~

for the following reasons:
One reason is that the former judg:-

ment, on its face, manifests its vulnerability on the ground of fraud.

When a judg-

ment roll shows on its face that the judgment is void or voidable, no one claiming
t:!tle under it is entitled to have it declared
valid on the plea that he is an innocent purchaser

0

Another reason is that J. Parry
Bowen was acting for the other plaintiffs
and cross =defendants as well as for himself in procuring that judgment.
Cross =defendants were associated
for that purpose with respect to this and
other lands, as their complaint shows, and
are in no posit)on to claim interests in appellant's land on the strength of that
ment as

"~innocent

judg~

purchasers 9 • .

Aga1np arguing that appellant's atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5.
tack on the prior judgment is a collateral
attack» respondents' brief asks:
~~can

appellant say that the real

pla1nhffs in this action, insofar as
the lands here involved are concerned» had anything to do with the
former aotion, were guilty of any fraud
in obtai:ping that judgment against him,

or can in anywise be brought to answer his allegations against J. Parry
Bowen?

91

(Res. Br. P. 38)

While this question is an implied recognition of fraud in obtaining the judgment
and does not help respondents' argument
that the cross =complaint against J. Parry
Bowen and his associates claiming interests
in the land under it is a collateral attack,
the answer to this question must be in the
affirmative, for the above stated reasons
and for the further reason that J. Parry
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bowen, as one of the plaintiffs, with his lessees and grantees of interests claimed by
him in the land, seeks in his, and their complalnt, to have title claimed by him in the
former achon quieted in them. Fraud in
the forl"fler action is imputed to all of the
parbes .insofar as if affects their claims to
title or interests under the Bowen judgment.
All are necessary and proper parties defendant in appellant's eros s =complaint.
Respondents' brief on the same page
further

states~

uJo Parry Bowen had no interest
in the property involved in this appeal
at the time of the commencement of
the present action, he having conveyed
all his interest to Keith J. Bowen by
quit= claim deed on April 26, 194 7 • .,
Therefore, the brief continues (P. 39):
HThe plaintiffs in this action insoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7.
far as the lands involved in this appeal
are concerned, are innocent purchasers
for value from J. Parry Bowen", citing·
U. C. A. 1943, Vol 2. 33-1-3 relating
to conveyances to defraud creditors-a contention here made for the first time
and wholly without merit.
At this point we call attention to the
following facts disclosed by the record be=
fore the Court:
On September 22, 1943, Burns Hallett9 father=in=law of Keith J. Bowen received
the admittedly void tax deed from Uintah
County to 365o93 acres of land including the
80 acres here involved, (Abs. Title, P. 37).
On December 8, 1945, Keith J. Bowen,
(son of J. Parry Bowen), made an oil lease
to Phillips Petroleum Company of 205.93
acres y in.cluded in the Tax Deed to Hallett
and including the 80 acres here involved,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8.
which lease was recorded May 13, 1946,
(Abs o 39).
On January 15, 1946, there was

re~

corded a quit claim deed of the same 205.93
acres from Burns Hallett and wife to J.
Parry Bowen, showing that J. Parry Bowen,
the father, and Keith J. Bowen, the son,
were alter=egos in dealing with this land.
J" Parry Bowen, on August 19, 1946,

(3.-.1/2 months before his default judgment),
made a ""Mineral Deedu to J. A. Cheney of an
undivided

one~half

interest in uan oil, gas

and other minerals in and under and that
may be produced fromu 432 aces of land
including a description of the 80 acres involved in this appeal, "together with the right
to explore v develop and produce oil, gas and
other minerals therefrom" with the further
provision

that~

uthis sale is made subject

to any rights now existing to any lessee or
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9.
assigns under any valid and subsisting oil
and gas lease of record heretofore executed,
1t being understood and agreed that said

grantee shall have, receive and enjoy the
herein granted undivided interest in and
to all bonuses» rents, royalties and other
benefits which may accrue under the terms
of sa1d lease insofar as it covers the above
descr1bed land from and after the date hereofjl precisely as if the grantee herein had
been at the date of the making of said lease
the owner of a similar undivided interest
in and to the lands described and the grantee

one of the lessors therein n (Referring, of
course to the Keith J Bowen lease to Phil=
0

lips Petroleum Company).
J

0

(Abs. P. 41)

o

A. Cheney entered into a royalty

contract with Guy T. Woodworth, dated July
26,

1947~

assigning an undivided one-fourth

interest in oil, gas and other minerals that
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10.
may be produced from this land,

~~being

now under oil and gas leases originally executed to Phillips Petroleum Company"
(Abso P. 46).
On December 2, 1946, the default
decree agamst appellant in Civil action 2388
in favor of J o Parry Bowen was filed and

recordedo(Abo Po 51-52}.
On November 20, 1946, twelve days
before that default decree was filed and recorded, J. Parry Bowen and Frances H ..
Bowen, his wife, J. A. Cheney and wife and
Keith J. Bowen and wife made a new lease
to the Phillips Petroleum Company of 432
acres including the 80 acres here involved,
which lease expires on November 20th of
this year, 1952, no occupation or develop=
ment having been done under said lease or
under the original lease made by Keith J.
Bowen

a
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11.
On May 15, 194 7, appears a quit
claim deed dated April 26, 194 7, from J.
Parry Bowen and wife Frances H. Bowen
to Keith J. Bowen, of 205 acres including
the 80 acres here involved and described in
the void tax deed to Hallett. (Abs. P. 55)
On May 15 » 194 7, also appears a conveyance by Keith J. Bowen and wife, dated
May 8 11 1947, (one week before the recording of J o Parry Bowen's quit claim deed to
Keith J o Bowen) 9 to Morley Dean and wife,
of surface rights on the same acreage, reserving (\ •an the minerals, oils, and gases
upon 9 or under the said lands or any part
thereof, together with the right to enter
upon the said lands or any part thereof, to
explore» dig or mine for such oils, minerals
and gasesvuo

(Abs. P. 56)
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12o
The

quit~claim

deed from J. Parry

Bowen and wife to Keith J

0

Bowen and the

deed from Keith J o Bowen and wife to Morley
Dean and wife were witnessed and acknowledged before Hugh W

0

Colton, as Notary

Public p who made the affidavit for publica=
tion of summons in the former actiono
On September 22, 1948, lis pendens
was filed in this blanket action of plaintiffs
and cross ~defendants, led by J. Parry Bowen, to many hundreds of acres of lands
against numerous defendants, including
appellant with reference to the 80 acres here
involveda
So 1t clearly appears that the plaintiffs and cross ·-~defendants, although only
the leader, J

0

Parry Bowen, was named a.s

plaintiff in Civil action 2388, were

associ~

ated in acquiring or attempting to acquire
title to all of the lands described in their
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13.
complaint, including appellants land, down
to the commencement of this blanket action
to quiet their claims of title, all knowing
of the vulnerability of their claims of title
or interest in appellants land and the apparent voidness of the default judgment

ob~

tained in Civil action 2388.

It seems to us that the argument
that the claims of other plaintiffs than J·.
Parry Bowen under this judgment cannot
be affected by the fact that it is void, is as
fallacious as is the argument that the judgment is nevertheless good as to J. Parry
Bowen's wife and administratrix.
TAXES

While it is beside the points at issue, appellants • counsel in their brief persistenly refer to the record of non=payment
of taxes, and make such statements as:
6

~the

record shows that appellant has not
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14.
paid taxes since the year 1932, and that, including the year 1933 to the present time,
he has paid no taxes on the property. Appellant does not claim to have paid any taxes
during said time and offers no excuse for
failing to make said payments"

0

(Res Br.
0

Po 45)
Apparently counsel is of the opinion here that it would have been material
in a trial of the issues for appellant to explain and prove an excuse for the non-payment of taxes in the years shown in the abstract of titleo But we are quite sure an objection would be made and properly sustained
if appellant attempted to do so in a trial of
the issueso However, since counsels' brief
invites an explanation we feel at liberty to
respondo
First, we call attention to the record
of payment and non-payment of taxes as
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15.
shown in that abstract of title.
Appellant began payment of taxes on
this land on February 28, 1916, redeeming
it from tax sales for the years 1914 and
1915 (Abs. P. 21), having acquired title as
of July 2, 1915, (Abs. Pgs. 24, 25, 26, 27).
Thereafter, all taxes assessed against the
property were paid until the year 1933, a
period of nineteen years. In 1933 the country was in the depth of the great economic
and industrial depression when fp.rmers
could hardly make a living much less pay
any rental for use of lands in the Uintah
Basin 9 or in the succeeding years through=
out that depression of the Thirtys.
In addition to the land here involved
appellant owned another acreage nearby, but
in the adjoining county, from which he had
been receiving annual rentals until the de ...
pression began when the occupants could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not pay rentals but did undertake to pay
taxes and water assessments on these lands.
Tax notices were sent to them for that pur=
pose but apparently they were not paid.

Ap~

pellant's neglect to see that they were paid
is at least somewhat excusable by the fact
that m 19 34 appellant entered public life,
g1ving practically all his time to the neglect of his private interests, in carrying on
a campaign in the political party primaries
and in the election of that year in which he
was nominated and elected to the State Senate of California from Los Angeles County
and was chairman of the State Committee
of his party in carrying on the election cam=
paign" Thereafter appellant continued for
two years as chairman of his party and was
occupied four years as State Senator from
January 1935 to January 1939, and as cand=
idate for Governor in the primaries and
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17.
elections of 1938. The following four years
appellant served as Governor. Appellants
time 9 attention, and energy was devoted to
those activities and duties, which caused
him to neglect giving personal attention to
the matter of taxes on his lands in the Uintah Basini as well as to other private interests.
The auditors tax deed to the County
was made April 15, 1938, and no taxes were
assessed thereafter until 1942, when it aP'- :
pears that the land was assessed to uuintah
County (Olsen) care Burns Hallett and that
a tax of $7.06 was paid; that a similar assessment was made in 1943, and a tax of
$7 o52 was paid for that year. (Abs. 59)
Up to 1942 it appears that appellant
paid all taxes assessed against the land
since 1913, except for the five year period
1933

~

1938.
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In 1944, 1945 and 1946 the land was
assessed to Burns Hallett and a tax of $12.92
was paid in 1944 and $14.63 in 1945 and

$15.68 in 1946. (Abs. 59)
In 194 7 and 1948 the land was assessed in the name of J. Parry Bowen, but
the taxes were not paid in either of those
years and the land went to tax sale for the
delinquency, (Ab. P. 60). Redemption from
that tax sale was not made and 1949 taxes
were not paid until December 30, 1949 (A b.
P. 61)~ long after this case was at issue,
and twenty three days after respondents
sought to obtain, on December 7, 1949, a
judgment w1thout the presence of appellant.
Appellant should have gone to Vernal in

1949 and personally examined the tax records instead of waiting for respondents'
Abstract of Title; had he done so he would
have redeemed the unpaid taxes for the
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years 194 7, 1948 and 1949.
Respondents Abstract does not in=
elude the record of tax payment in 1950, but
no denial will be made by them of the fact
that the tax assessed for that year was paid
by appellant who also tried to pay the 1951
tax, only to find that it had been paid long
in advance of its due date by others.
So we have a record of tax payments
by appellant for nineteen years up to December 30, 1949 and tax payments presumably by Hallett for two years up to the time
of the commencement of Civil Action 2388,
after Hallett received his tax deed in 1943;
or five years, including 1942 and 1943, when
the land was assessed to Uintah County (Olson) care of Burns Hallett.
Respondents brief says, (P. 47):
6

'Had he (appellant) not abandoned

the property and for more than sixteen
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years had paid no attention to it to the
extent that he did not know the property
he owned originally, he might have some
ground for direct attack as did the plaintiff in the Liebhardt

case~"

The only thing appellant was uncertain about
upon receiving service in this case was whe=
ther the 80 acres described in the complaint
was the 80 acres which appellant owne.d not
far away from it, or whether it was the 80
acres involved in this suit, without looking
up the description in the records as to each
property

a

Respondents • wishing to have this

property considered as having been "aban=
doned for 16 years" by appellant will be disappointed by the record of Clarence I.

John~

sons' testimony, (see transcript) taken out
of order in anticipation of a trial of the issue
of adverse possession raised in respondents
pleadings, which establishes the fact that
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2.1.

appellant had never thought of abandoning
this land and his right and title thereto.
It is apparent from the record that
respondents' counsel sought to procure a
judgment in this action without a trial and
finally succeeded, by inducing the lower
court to grant respondents motion for sum.,
mary judgment. Appellant was served with
summons on September 16, 1949, a year after the action was commenced. Appellants
original answer was served and filed in
October. Respondents counsel had the case
set for December 7, 1949, without notice to
appellant, and no notice was given to

appel~=

ant of that setting until on or about that date
when it was physically impossible for him
to be present.
Notwithstanding that fact, as respon=
dents brief admits, their counsel attempted
to secure judgment in default of appellants
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appearance when the Court, upon receiving a telegram from appellant, protesting
against a trial on that date because of insufficiency of notice, found that no sufficient nohce had been given, and continued
the case until January.

No decree was

g1ven uquieting title as against the land
involved in this appeal", as counsel puts
it, (Res Br. P. 2), until the summary dec

cree from which this appeal is taken. No
decree as to other defendants solely affecting other lands in which appellant
claimed no interest and with respect to
which appellant is not named as a defend=
ant was given until March 1, 19 50, which
decree by Judge Tuckett, says ''this decree
shall in no manner affect. the interest of
Culbert L. Olson in and to'' the 80 acres
here involved.

(App. Br. P. 2 - 3, R. 119).

It is true that Mr. Stanley, respondSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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23.
ents counsel, called appellant on the telephone after his failure to procure a default
decree on December 7, 1949. It is not true
that appellant then, or ever, or at all, told
Mr" Stanley that "he probably would disclarm in the matter ... , as stated in respond·
ents brief, Po 2, or that he had any thought
of doing so. It is true that appellant asked
Mr" Stanley when he would send appellant
his abstract of title and tell appellant the
basis of respondents claim of title, which
appellant had repeatedly asked him to do
beginning immediately after being served
with summons on September 16, 1949.

It is not true that appellant request=
ed of Mro Stanley Ha citation of a case or
two on adverse possession as viewed by
the Utah Supreme Court as he was not up
on those things" (Res. Br. P 2- 3). Appellant was quite familar with decisions of
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this court on that subject, particularly one
in which he represented an appellant in

whose favor the lower courts adverse decision was reversed.
It is true that • •nothing was said in

that conversation about the decree in Civil
action 2388". Appellant could not have said
anything about that decree because he had
never known or heard of it or of such an
action, and Mro Stanley, strangely enough,
in view of his present contention, did not
see fit to mention it.

JUDGMENT IN FORMER
ACTION IS VOID ON ITS
FACE
In closing we wish to reiterate and
emphasize Point I of our opening brief, that
the original judgment is void on its face and
should be so held in this case consistent
with previous decisions of this Honorable
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Court.. Had the affidavit for publication of
summons in the Liebhardt case been a part
of the judgment roll at that time, there can
be no doubt, in view of the Court's decision, that the judgment in that case would
have been held void on its' face.
If an affidavit for service by pub-

lication merely states that "'the defendant
is a non= resident of the state", can it be
held that an order for publication and a de=
fault judgment on proof of publication based
on such an affidavit, is not void on its face
when» as in this case, the affidavit is made
a part of the Judgment Roll by legislative
enactment?

For the same reason can an

affidavit stating that the

44

defendant resides

outside of the State of Utah and person serVlce cannot be had'g sustain an order for
service by publication only and sustain a
default judgment based on such service?
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If, added to that, the affidavit states that

affiant has made diligent search and inquiry
to find defendant in the State of Utah, or a
statement that ufor the purpose of finding
said defendant, (affiant) has made diligent
search 1n the State of Utah and has checked
the records of both to determine the last
addre 5 s of the defendant, and finds that his
last address was John Doe, unknown,. an
anomalous, inexplicable statement of an
impossibility on
ion patently false

it~s
=

face with a conclus-

because no public re =

cord of unknown non-residents of Utah is
or could be kept - sustain such a judgment,
when there is not a scintilla of "evidenti=
ary or probative facts

u

given from which

anyone could infer that the defendants place
of re 5 idence was unknown to anybody, not
even to the affiant or the plaintiff or that
any effort was made to find the place of
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0

residence of defendant in or outside the
state of Utah?
As stated in our opening brief: "With=
out swearmg to facts, the affidavit can swear
to nothing'

9

It 1s the same as if no statement

0

about hnding defendant were made at all.
In th1s case it is worse than that in that it
manifests on its face the fraud it perforce
perpetrates

0

We submit that no lawyer can look
at this perfunctory judgment roll in Civil
Action 2388

~

the complaint, a form of sum-

mons with no return thereon, the affidavit
for the order for publication and the order
by the Clerk, all filed and made at the same
time» the pracipe and Clerk's entry of defaultp filed immediately on the expiration
of the period of publication, followed by the
signing and filing of the default decree w:ithout pronouncing that judgment void on
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it's face mdependant of additional proof of
ies fraud?

No; and the lawyers for respon-

dents so pronounced it and respondents,
aware of its invalidity, prudently brought
th:s acLon against appellant for that reason~

(R. p. 188: App. Br. 6 and 7) before

attempting to occupy or do anything on the
land.
Respectfully submitted,
Culbert L. Olson
Clyde S. Johnson
Cyrus G. Gatrell
Attorneys for appellant
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